

Identifying Effective Policing Strategies for Reducing Crime

FINAL REPORT

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Executive Summary

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), working with police chiefs and mayors, have raised the concern that following a steady decline in violent crime that began in the early 1990s, the nation's cities are experiencing an increasing violent crime trend. A number of potential factors were identified as the possible sources behind an increase but the primary intent of PERF reports and forums has been to draw attention to this possible upward trend in violent crime so that the nation can act in such a way as to prevent this from escalating to a violent crime epidemic such as that experienced in the mid- to late 1980s. In response to these types of concerns, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) requested that the Sagamore Institute conduct a study that could point to promising policing strategies that might inform local, state, and federal policy with the goal of violent crime prevention and control.

As the PERF project indicated, there is variation across the nation's cities in terms of patterns and trends in violent crime. The current project sought to study this variation as a way of identifying cities that have avoided the increase in violent crime experienced in many communities in 2005-2006. The thought was that there may be policing strategies in such communities that have played a role in stemming the increase in violent crime that could serve as promising practices for other police departments and local governments.

The first step in the study was an analysis of violent crime trends in U.S. cities of 100,000 population and greater covering the period of 2000-2001 to 2005-2006. Controlling for sociodemographic characteristics shown in prior research to account for some of the cross-city variation in violent crime, the analysis considered several of the factors that have been hypothesized as relating to the recent increase in violent crime. Specifically, changes in the size of the law enforcement workforce (sworn officers) as well as the size of the state prison population were considered.

Changes in the number of sworn police officers did not relate to changes in violent crime levels. This is not to imply that police staffing levels do not relate to levels of violent crime, as prior research has found that they are important. However, it does suggest that looking across the nation's cities during the first half of this decade does not find that changing levels of sworn officers accounts for shifts in violent crime. In contrast, shifts in the state's prison population do correlate with changing levels of violent crime. Cities located in states with an increasing prison population tended to experience a decreasing trend in violent crime. In contrast, cities located in states with declining or smaller increases in the prison population were more likely to experience increasing violent crime. Again, this should not be considered conclusive because prior research has shown the relationship between prison populations and violent crime to be dynamic. However, it does suggest that one of the factors identified in the PERF forums, a strained corrections system, is worth further investigation.

The additional finding of the cross-city analysis was that sociodemographic characteristics did relate to violent crime trends. Specifically, a factor based on percent of the population under 18 years of age, percent white, and percent high school graduates accounted for some of the variation across cities, consistent with prior research.

Having identified these correlates of city violent crime trends, the next step of the analysis involved identifying cities that were lower and higher in their trend in violent crime than predicted on the basis of these statistical models. Specifically, the analysis was intended to identify those cities that were clear “outliers” in terms of their trend in violent crime from 2000-2001 to 2005-2006. The thought was that these outliers, particularly the cities that experienced lower levels of homicide and robbery trends than predicted based on their sociodemographic characteristics, would provide useful sites to explore for promising policing practices.

Among the cities that appeared as having a lower trend in homicide and robbery than predicted were Chicago (IL), El Monte (CA), Tampa (FL), and Topeka (KS). Background information was gathered about each city and site visits were conducted. It should be noted that this represents an exploratory study intended to identify promising strategies and interventions. The research did not include a formal test of the effectiveness of these strategies’ impact on violent crime.

With this qualification in mind, a set of common themes emerged across these varying cities. First, each community has placed significant attention on building strong partnerships with other components of the criminal justice system, with local government, the business community, and with neighborhood groups and residents. Second, each community has established regular processes for analyzing crime patterns, feeding this information to officers and managers, and building accountability for crime prevention and control into the mission of the department. Third, each department has decentralized policing services to focus on specific neighborhoods and reporting districts. The result of these partnerships, local focus, and data-driven processes are highly focused, deterrence-based interventions. This is consistent with one of the key findings of the National Academies of Science review of effective policing strategies that called for very focused interventions geared toward specific contexts and crime problems (National Research Council, 2004).

One of the limitations of this exploratory investigation is that it was not possible to systematically assess and test the specific dimensions of these common themes. At one level, it is likely true that every police department in the nation can point to partnerships, routine crime analysis, local focus, and focused interventions. Thus, the question remains of whether these dimensions discriminate practices and processes that more or less effectively prevent and control violent crime. Likely this is an issue of “the devil is in the details.” The details, in turn, likely include the quality and “dosage” of the resulting interventions. In all four cities, evidence pointed to the effective integration of all these components resulting in intensive and focused interventions. Future research could profitably build measures and benchmarks of these themes that could then be studied in comparative fashion.

Finally, the additional ingredient that was evident in these four cities was leadership. The specific people and roles varied across the sites but in every jurisdiction clear leaders were evident who continually placed emphasis on the need and expectation that the police, working in concert with other community partners, were responsible for preventing and controlling violent crime. This expectation, in turn, translated into an expectation that ongoing problem analysis would be occurring and that leaders throughout the organization would know what was currently happening in terms of violent crime trends; that department personnel were expected to work in

collaboration with multiple formal and informal partners; that problems would be examined at the local level; and, that participating partners would bring resources to bear on these local problems with the result of very focused interventions specific to the area and the specific type of crime.

As a final note, this research also highlighted the limitations of current national crime reporting systems. The impetus for the research was the concern expressed by PERF that a homicide and violent crime epidemic could be emerging. Yet, the only comparative crime data that would allow policymakers and criminal justice professionals to monitor crime patterns and trends are out-of-date. The issues highlighted in the PERF Forum call for ongoing surveillance information systems that would provide near real-time information on the nation's violent crime trends. The existing system is the equivalent of economic policymaking based on inflation and unemployment data that are one year to 18 months old. Just as such a monitoring system is inadequate in the economic and public health sectors, so too are crime information systems providing year old information on crime trends. As local police department information systems become increasingly sophisticated, the opportunity for national investment by BJS and OJP to build a timely national crime reporting system to complement the Uniform Crime Reporting system is both available and needed.

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Background

On August 30, 2006, the Police Executive Research Forum (“PERF”) hosted a meeting of police chiefs and mayors from across the country, as part of a series of “Critical Issues in Policing” meetings hosted by PERF and funded by the Motorola Corporation. This particular meeting was focused on reports of increases in violent crime in some communities and the consequent increase on a nationwide basis reflected in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) Uniform Crime Report (“UCR”) for 2005. The figures, of course, must be viewed in relation to the crime rates reported via the UCR and the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (“BJS”) National Crime Victimization Survey (“NCVS”) over the past several years. While they do represent an increase in the number of certain violent crimes nationwide over 2004, the 2005 data demonstrate that the number of violent crimes in the selected categories in 2005 was nonetheless well below the number of violent crimes in the same categories in recent years. PERF recognizes this in its report (“A Gathering Storm – Violent Crime in America”), but cautions that the nation and its law enforcement professionals should not take solace in that fact because the increase may well be a harbinger of further increases to come.

The participants in the August 30 meeting listed a number of factors that, based on subjective observation, the participants in the meeting believed to be “contributing to the increasing violent crime trend.” Some of the listed factors may in fact reflect phenomena that serve to increase the occurrence of crime. However, some are in the nature of evidence of increases as opposed to having a causative effect (e.g., “high recidivism rates”), some may have a relationship to a decrease in the effectiveness of the police/community response (e.g., “decrease in police department staffing levels”), and some may be none of the above. The factors listed in the PERF report are as follows:

- a decrease in police department staffing levels;
- an increase in robberies that involve shootings (even when a victim complies);
- high recidivism rates;
- an increasing number of retaliatory shootings, as well as shootings that stem from disagreements or feeling disrespected;
- a strain on police resources to respond to violent crime as well as other calls for service;
- crime becoming “a sport;”
- the ready availability of guns;
- a focus on homeland security and away from local law enforcement issues;
- decreased federal involvement in crime prevention and community policing;
- a strained social service community, educational system and criminal justice system, particularly courts and corrections;
- offenders re-entering the community who commit new crimes;
- challenges with the educational system to include poor high school graduation rates;
- the glamorization of violence and the “thug” pop culture; and
- the resurgence of drugs, particularly methamphetamines.

In order to determine what kind of action may be needed, both on a local and federal level, to keep violent criminal activity from continuing to increase, research is needed to identify effective practices that might be replicated in various parts of the country. It may be that different

strategies are needed for different types of crime challenges and/or different jurisdictional sizes. There may also be various demographic factors that jurisdictions must take into account in order to determine the prospectively most effective approach for the challenges facing authorities in particular jurisdictions.

Although it is not possible to test all of the factors mentioned as possible causes of increasing violent crime rates, the Sagamore Institute for Policy Research (“Sagamore Institute”) study involved examining the impact of several of these factors that have been suggested by prior research to have an impact on city levels of violent crime. The intent was to compare cities along these dimensions as an initial step in identifying jurisdictions that appear to be successful in suppressing violent criminal activity. That is, after controlling for some of these forces thought to be driving violent crime, the question became whether certain jurisdictions have avoided the increases in violent crime suffered by other jurisdictions.

The study involved examining the specific violent crime challenges faced by the more successful jurisdictions, as well as the strategies and tactics employed by those jurisdictions, in order to determine what specific strategies and tactics may be responsible for their success. As a part of this examination, we looked at the respective roles of local government, federal government, and community organizations in these jurisdictions. The intent of this final report is to point to recommendations and strategies for both local and federal government entities to assist in addressing the challenge of violent crime.

The project was divided into 3 specific phases culminating in a report on promising strategies employed to reduce violent crime. As will be described, Phase I involved creation of a city-level database used to identify cities that appear to have avoided the increase in violent crime. Phase II involved site visits to a small number of these jurisdictions to look for common components of their crime prevention and control strategies. Phase III is represented by this final report.

Data Description

Each year, the FBI estimates the current population for cities with more than 10,000 people. In this estimate, a growth curve function is created and combined with the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2000 population in order to control for positive and negative population growth changes within, and across, cities. For this study, we selected cities with a population above 100,000 people using the FBI’s 2005 population estimate.¹

Two hundred fifty three cities spread across 46 states were selected based on these criteria.² These cities are relatively evenly distributed across the 46 states that house cities of this size. Only three states have more than ten cities with a population above 100,000 people. They are California (62 cities, 24.5 percent of the total), Florida (17 cities, 6.7 percent of the total), and Texas (25 cities, 9.9 percent of the total). No other state houses more than 4 percent of the total proportion of all the cities selected.

¹ While we rely on the preliminary data from the UCR for 2006, not all data were available at the time of the study. Thus, we chose the latest possible year (2005) where all data were currently available from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

² Delaware, Maine, Montana and North Dakota did not have a city with over 100,000 population.

Specific data were gathered for the 253 cities that were divided into three different categories: demographic data, crime data, and law enforcement data. Figure 1 displays the specific variables in each of the three data categories.

Figure 1: Data variables for large cities (over 100,000 population)

Demographic	Crime (annual)	Law Enforcement
2000	2000 through 2006	2000, 2004, 2005
City population	Murder count	Total LE employees
% under age 18	Assault count*	Total civilian employees
% white	Robbery count*	Total LE officers (sworn)
% high school graduates		State correctional institution detainees
% homeownership		
Median household income		
Land use (area)		
People per square mile		

*Preliminary 2006 data were somewhat incomplete and were excluded from analyses presented here-in

Unless otherwise specified, the data come from the following sources: all demographic data came from the U.S. Census (<http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html>). The crime data are from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports (<http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm>). The law enforcement data are from Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/police/index.html>. The state prison data are from <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm>

Stage 1a: Changes in Homicide

As Figure 1 indicates, crime data were collected for the years 2000-2006. For a city (i.e. site) to be included in the homicide analysis the city could not have any missing homicide data points. Therefore, if a city had ‘missing’ data for any year in the analysis, they were excluded from the subsequent trend analyses. Two hundred thirty three cities spread across 43 states³ were included in the homicide analysis, which is just over 92 percent of the total number of eligible cities.

We conducted a number of trend analyses on the homicide data by calculating ‘difference’ scores. Difference scores (DS) were obtained by subtracting Time 2 from Time 1 (DS= Time 1 - Time 2). In order to determine the most parsimonious operationalization for the Time 1 and Time 2 constructs, we operationalized Time 1 and Time 2 several ways, including the aggregation of multiple years for each of the time variables.⁴ Results from most of the analyses were very reliable, or consistent, across the different outcomes. Ultimately, for the Phase I homicide trend analysis, we operationalized Time 1 as the sum of homicide counts in each city

³ Alaska, Mississippi, and South Dakota were also excluded due to missing data in those cities with greater than 100,000 population.

⁴ For example, Time 1 was defined as 2000; 2000-2001; 2000-2002. Time 2 was defined as 2006; 2005-2006; 2004-2006.

for the years 2000 and 2001 (Time 1= Total homicides 2000 + Total homicides 2001), while Time 2 was operationalized as the sum of the homicide counts in each city for the years 2005 and 2006 (Time 2= Total homicides 2005 + Total homicides 2006). In order to control for the different sized cities, we calculated these time changes based on the *rate of crime per 100,000* fixed with the 2000 U.S. Census data. Please refer to Figure 2 for the formula for the difference in homicide over time.

Figure 2: Difference Scores

$$DS = \frac{\text{Time 1}}{\text{City population}} - \frac{\text{Time 2}}{\text{City population}}$$

$$DS = \frac{\text{Total homicides 2000} + \text{Total homicides 2001}}{\text{City Population 2000}} - \frac{\text{Total homicides 2005} + \text{Total homicides 2006}}{\text{City Population 2000}}$$

Only the cities that had homicide data for each year (2000, 2001, 2005, 2006) were included in this analysis.

The Difference Scores revealed 146 cities (62.6 percent) that experienced a decline in the homicide rate between Time 1 and Time 2, eight cities (3.4 percent) that experienced no change, and 79 cities (34 percent) that experienced an increase in the homicide rate over time (Table 1). Overall, the average (mean) is 1.26 fewer homicides per 100,000 population with an overall median decline of .97 homicides per 100,000. This means that overall, the change between Time 1 and Time 2 for the cities in this analysis is a slight negative skew, but the distribution approximates a normal distribution (where the mean, median, and mode are centralized).

Table 1: Homicide rate difference scores

Action	Number of cities	Percent
Homicide rate decreased	146	62.6
Homicide rate did not change	8	3.4
Homicide rate increased	79	34.0
Total	233	100.0

The average (i.e. mean) *decrease* in homicides per 100,000 population for the 146 cities that experienced a decline in the homicide rate between Time 1 and Time 2 was 3.27 fewer homicides per 100,000 people. The median decline was 2.52 fewer homicides per 100,000 people. For the 37 cities comprising the upper quartile in homicide reduction (between 4.14 and 17.1 fewer homicides per 100,000), the average (i.e. mean) reduction for these particular cities is 7.25 homicides per 100,000 population while the median decline for the cities in this quartile is a reduction of 5.67 homicides per 100,000 population.

The average (i.e. mean) *increase* in homicides per 100,000 population for the 79 cities that experienced an increase in the homicide rate between Time 1 and Time 2 was 2.33 more homicides per 100,000 population. The overall median increase was 1.46 more homicides per 100,000 between Time 1 and Time 2. For the 20 cities comprising the upper quartile (between 2.84 and 21.5 more homicides per 100,000) for the cities with an increase, the average (i.e.

mean) rise for these particular cities was 5.84 more homicides per 100,000. The median increase for these cities 4.10 more homicides per 100,000 between Time 1 and Time 2.

Table 2: Homicide rate difference score (DS) central tendencies

Rate decreases (n=146)	Mean	Median
Overall	-1.26	-.97
Upper quartile	-7.25	-5.67
Rate increases (n=79)		
Overall	2.33	1.46
Upper quartile	5.84	4.10

Stage 1b: Changes in Violent Crime

We were also interested in assessing the pattern, and changes, of violent crime in large U.S. cities over time. We operationalized violent crime as the sum of all homicides, assaults, and robberies in each city, for each year that defines our time measure. In order for a city to be included in the violent crime analysis, it must have available the homicide count, assault count, and robbery count for each year included in the analysis. Since preliminary 2006 data for robberies and assaults were not as readily available as 2006 homicide data, we relied on violent crimes measures from 2000 to 2005. This means that if a city had ‘missing’ data for any of these three offenses for any of the years 2000, 2001, 2004, or 2005, that city was excluded from the subsequent trend analyses.

Two hundred thirty two cities were included in this analysis, which is 91.6 percent of the total cities possible.

Similar to the homicide analysis, we conducted a number of trend analyses on the violent crime data by calculating ‘difference’ scores using the following formula: Time 1 - Time 2. For the Phase I violent crime trend analysis, we similarly operationalized Time 1 as the combination of violent crime for 2000 and 2001 and Time 2 as the aggregate of violent crime for 2004 and 2005. And, again, these time changes calculated based on the rate per 100,000 population.

The Difference Scores revealed 134 cities (57.7 percent) that had a decline in the violent crime rate between Time 1 and Time 2, one city (< 1 percent) that had no change in violent crime, and 97 cities (41.8 percent) that experienced a rise in the violent crime rate over time. Overall, there is an average (i.e. mean) decline of 9.82 violent crimes per 100,000 people over Time 1 and Time 2, with a median decline of 16.19 fewer violent crimes.

Table 3: Violent crime difference scores

Action	Number of cities	Percent
Violent crime rate decreased	134	57.7
Violent crime rate did not change	1	<1.0
Violent crime rate increased	97	41.8
Total	232	100.0

Overall mean decrease= 9.82
Overall median decrease= 16.19
Upper quartile mean decrease= 337.6
Upper quartile median decrease= 282.2

The average (i.e. mean) *decrease* in violent crimes per 100,000 population for the 134 cities that experienced a decline in the violent crime between Time 1 and Time 2 was 123.36 fewer violent crimes per 100,000 people while the median decline was 63.73 fewer violent crimes per 100,000 population. For the 33 cities comprising in the upper quartile in violent crime reduction (between 142.6 and 788.08 fewer violent crimes per 100,000), the average (i.e. mean) reduction for these particular cities was 337.6 violent crimes per 100,000 population with a median decline was 282.2 violent crimes per 100,000.

The average (i.e. mean) *increase* in violent crimes per 100,000 population for the 97 cities that experienced an increase in the violent crime rate between Time 1 and Time 2, was 146.9 more violent crimes per 100,000 population while the median increase was 103.8 more violent crimes per 100,000 population. For the 24 cities comprising the upper quartile (between 185.2 and 872.1 more violent crimes per 100,000), the average (i.e. mean) increase is a rise of 359.7 violent crimes per 100,000. The median increase for the upper quartile is 285.2 more violent crimes per 100,000.

Table 4: Violent crime rate difference score central tendencies

Rate decreased (n=134)	Mean	Median
Overall	-123.36	-63.73
Upper quartile	-337.6	-282.2
Rate increased (n=97)		
Overall	146.9	103.8
Upper quartile	359.7	285.2

Stage 2: Explaining City Wide Homicide

In the second stage of the analysis, we move from a general analysis of homicide and violent crime changes over time toward a theoretically driven modeling approach. In particular, we examined some of the structural and demographic variables that are well established in the literature, particularly the literature on social disorganization, to both explain, and control for, potential changes in cities' crime patterns (see for example, Sampson and Groves, 1989; Land,

McCall, and Cohen, 1990; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997).

Variable Description

In this section, we describe the operationalization and measurement for each of our outcome, covariate, and control measures in order to more accurately model the change in the large city’s homicide rates.

City homicide rates for Time 1 and Time 2

Figure 3 displays the city homicide rate per 100,000 population at Time 1 (t1) and at Time 2 (t2).

Figure 3: City Homicide rate per 100,000 population

$$HR_{t1} = \frac{\text{homicide count 2000} + \text{homicide count 2001}}{\text{city population 2000}}$$

$$HR_{t2} = \frac{\text{homicide count 2005} + \text{homicide count 2006}}{\text{city population 2000}}$$

Criminal Justice Structural Variables

One of the hypothesized factors contributing to increased violent crime mentioned in the PERF report was a decline in law enforcement staffing levels. Indeed, several studies have found a relationship between the number of police and the crime rate (Levitt, 1997 and 1998; Marvell and Moody, 1996), though they have not assessed staffing trends during the recent period of concern.

In order to assess the effect that law enforcement staffing levels have on citywide crime rates, we use several constructs to unravel this relationship. First, we used measures of the number of law enforcement personnel in each city. In addition to the agency-reported crime numbers as part of the UCR system, law enforcement organizations also report the number of active officers employed in the department at the end of each year. Thus, we created a variable called *Law Enforcement Time 1* (LEt1), which is the number of police officers in each city in the year 2000. For our final analysis, we also created a variable called the *Law Enforcement Difference*, which is the Law Enforcement Time 1 variable minus the number of law enforcement officers in each city during the year 2005 (e.g., Law Enforcement at Time 2).

Figure 4: Criminal Justice Structural Variables

LEt1=	# of sworn officers (2000)
LEt2=	# of sworn officers (2005)
LED=	LEt1 – LEt2
Pt1=	Number of state correctional institution detainees (2000)
Pt2=	Number of state correctional institution detainees (2005)
PD=	Pt1-Pt2

In addition to the level of police staffing, the PERF Report points to the strained social service and criminal justice system, including the correctional system, as potential factors contributing to varying levels of violent crime. Although a subject of debate, several researchers have found a relationship between the number of incarcerated individuals and the level of crime (Marvell and Moody, 1994; Levitt, 1996; Spelman, 2005). Thus, another important criminal justice structural variable that we felt it necessary to model is the number of detainees in the state's correctional institutions, and the trend in numbers imprisoned during the time period of interest. The measurement of *Prison at Time 1 (Pt1)* is the number of state and federal prisoners held in private facilities, local jails, or other States' facilities by jurisdiction (Bureau of Justice Assistance) in each state in the year 2000, which is reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The second variable we relied on regarding the prison population is a variable called *Prison Difference (PD)*, which is defined as Prison at Time 1 minus the number of prisoners incarcerated at the state level during the year 2005 (e.g., Prison at Time 2).

We note that the variables used to capture prison population are much more control variables (e.g., we are not attempting to determine their true association with the change in homicide rates but rather are including them to, at a minimum, have a more theoretically accurate model). We also note that we do not make the assumption that each of the large cities within the state account for the total variation in the state's prison population. We assume that the presence of any existing bias by using this state level variable at the city level becomes marginal when including the same estimate for other large cities in the same state (i.e., a cross-out effect). Until data are available on each city's contribution to the state prison population, we are limited to this assumption. By adding a state level correctional variable as a city-level control, we have a more theoretically relevant and more fully specified model.

City Demographic Variables

It is well established within the criminological literature that the demographic makeup of an area's inhabitants has a direct association with the amount of crime within it. Briefly, social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay, 1942) suggests that the breakdown of social institutions in a community lead to crime. Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability leads to the dissolution of social bonds and friendships residents have in their community. As a result, informal social control in communities is weakened and social disorganization emerges. Similarly, social disorganization theory posits that population density and size are related to homicide rates because they decrease community integration and hinder surveillance mechanisms in neighborhoods (Sampson & Groves, 1989).

In order to control for the variation that each city consistently had in terms of its demographic makeup, we created two city-level factor variables relying on principal component analysis. The first construct measured the citywide *income potential (IP)* of its residents. Three measures were included in the income potential construct: percent below 18 years old, percent white and percent that are high school graduates. The second city level demographic construct we created using Principal Component Factor Analysis was *residential stability (RS)*. Our residential stability variable was comprised of three US Census measures: percent homeownership, median home

income, and people per square mile. Please refer to the Technical Appendix for a more detailed explanation regarding the factor variables.

Figure 5: City level factor variables

Variable	Factors
Income potential (IP)	% below 18 years of age % white % high school graduates
Residential stability (RS)	% home ownership median home income people per square mile

In order for us to assess whether we had adequate structural and demographic controls, it was first necessary to evaluate the ability of these measures to adequately explain our crime measure at Time 1. Thus, we relied on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate both the statistical as well as substantive parameters for the estimates we used in this study.

We conducted this analysis under the assumption that if our model moderately explains the city homicide rate at Time 1, then the variables included in this model will serve as adequate control variables when we regressed the city’s Time 2 homicide rate onto the Time 1 homicide rate.

The outcome variable in this model was the city homicide rate at Time 1. The model’s ANOVA F-Statistic, which tests whether or not any of the parameters in the model significantly covary with the outcome, was statistically significant ($p < .01$). There are two criminal justice structural variables in the model: state’s prison population at Time 1 (Pt1) and city law enforcement (LEt1) at Time 1. We also included the two city demographic variables in this model: residential stability (RS) and income potential (IP). These estimates are fixed based on the 2000 US Census data. Figure 6 displays the full OLS multiple regression equation for this model can be written as follows:

Figure 6: OLS Regression equation 1

$$Y = a + b_1 * X_1 + b_2 * X_2 + b_3 * X_3 + b_4 * X_4$$

Where:

Y is the city homicide rate at Time 1

a is the regression’s intercept

b₁ is the partial slope coefficient for the state’s prison estimate at Time 1 (Pt1)

b₂ is the partial slope coefficient city law enforcement at Time 1 (LEt1)

b₃ is the partial slope coefficient for the factor variable of income potential (IP)

b₄ is the partial slope coefficient for the residential stability factor (RS)

According to the Adjusted R-Square, which controls for the number of variables in the model, the covariates in the model explained 34.7 percent of the variation in the city homicide rate at

Time 1. Table 5 shows both the statistical and substantive impact each of the covariates included in the model have with the city’s homicide rate at Time 1. Two variables had a statistically significant association with the city homicide rate at Time 1: state’s prison population at Time 1 and the city’s Income Potential factor variable. These two variables also had the largest substantive contribution to the outcome, as evidenced by the Standardized Beta coefficient. The city’s income potential had the largest standardized association with homicide at Time 1, followed closely by the state’s prison population at Time 1. The other variables did not significantly covary with the homicide rate at Time 1.

Table 5: OLS Regression Results for City Homicide Rate at Time 1

Model Parameters	Coefficient	B	St. Error	T-Value
Intercept	12.64		.829	15.2
<i>CJ Structural Variables</i>				
Prison T1 ***	-.005	-.405	.829	-6.64
Law Enforcement T1	.001	.008	.000	.130
<i>Demographic Variables</i>				
Income Potential ***	-4.93	-.535	.603	-8.18
Residential Stability	-.838	-.090	.608	-1.38

***p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.10

Mixed Lag/Difference Model

Our final statistical model was built upon all of the preceding analyses used in this study. Specifically, we estimated a mixed lag/difference model (Sampson and Morenoff, 1997) estimating the city homicide rate at Time 2 onto the city homicide rate at Time 1, controlling for criminal justice structural variables and citywide demographic factors. The model is most heavily reliant on the lagged approach because the Time 2 city homicide rate is regressed onto the Time 1 city homicide rate, which fulfills the lagged approach requirement.

The model also incorporated a ‘semi-differencing’ approach (Firebaugh and Beck, 1994) because we examined two change variables: state prison population change (Pt1 – Pt2) and the city law enforcement change (LEt1 – LEt2). These two change variables served as criminal justice structural controls because we were controlling for criminal justice changes between time 1 and time 2 in our regression. The two city demographic variables (RS and IP) are fixed for the US Census year of 2000.

When examining the relationship between the city homicide rate at Time 1 with its same rate at Time 2, we saw there was a very strong correlation (Pearson’s R = .910; p < .001). This means cities that experienced a high homicide rate at Time 1 very typically experienced a similarly high homicide rate at Time 2 (and vice versa). This model is extremely useful when trying to assess the cities that deviate from its Time 1 homicide rate (both higher and lower). One might argue that the demographic and criminal justice structural variables would largely account for this

deviation. Thus, we included these covariates as controls, which will reduce the bias in our model's estimates. Figure 7 displays the full OLS equation for the second model.

Figure 7: OLS equation 2

$$Y = a + b_1 * X_1 + b_2 * X_2 + b_3 * X_3 + b_4 * X_4 + b_5 * X_5$$

Where:

Y is the city homicide rate at Time 2

a is the regression's intercept

b₁ is the partial slope coefficient for the city's homicide rate at Time 1

b₁ is the partial slope coefficient for the state's prisons population change (PD)

b₂ is the partial slope coefficient city's law enforcement change (LED)

b₃ is the partial slope coefficient for the factor variable of income potential (IP)

b₄ is the partial slope coefficient for the residential stability factor (RS)

Table 6 displays the following results from our estimated model. The model's ANOVA F-Statistic, which tests whether or not any of the parameters in the model significantly covary with the outcome, is statistically significant ($p < .01$). The Adjusted R-square is .836, which means 83.6 percent of the variance in the city's homicide rate at Time 2 can be explained by our model. This high degree of variance is expected given that we included the city's Time 1 homicide rate as an independent variable. Only the law enforcement difference (LED) between Time 1 and Time 2 was not statistically significant at the alpha .10 level. All other covariates and controls were significantly associated with the city's crime rate at Time 2. According to the standardized coefficient estimates, the greatest predictor of the city's homicide rate at Time 2 is its rate at Time 1 ($B = .863$).

Table 6: OLS Regression Results for City Homicide Rate at Time 2

Model Parameters	Coefficient	B	St. Error	T-Value
Intercept	2.90		.506	5.74
Homicide Rate T1***	.898	.863	.033	27.55
<i>CJ Structural-Control Variables</i>				
Prison Dif. **	-.805	-.066	.341	-2.36
Law Enforcement Dif.	<-.001	-.020	.001	-.694
<i>Demographic-Control Variables</i>				
Income Potential **	-.678	-.071	.305	-2.22
Residential Stability *	-.566	-.058	.313	-1.80

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$

This type of mixed lag/difference model serves a major purpose for this study: it allowed us to identify cities that have a substantive increase/decrease in its Time 2 homicide rate compared with its Time 1 homicide rate. Our definition of *substantive difference* is described in detail.

Substantive Difference

In OLS regression, the interpretation is as follows: a unit change in x (i.e. the independent variable) is associated with an estimated slope (or change) in y (i.e. the outcome variable or dependent variable) (Berry and Feldman, 1985). This is also true when there are multiple independent variables included in the model. When there is a deviation from this expected estimate in the observed outcome, this is referred to as the ‘residual’, which is on a standardized scale. In social science statistics, where a residual is +/- 2 standard deviations from the mean, this is often referred to as an outlier (Berry and Feldman, 1985). In an effort to identify cities that have a substantially different homicide rate at Time 2 compared with their Time 1 rate, while controlling for demographic and structural factors, we examine those cities that meet this criterion.

We identified the top five cities that had a higher observed homicide rate at Time 2 than expected (based off of the following model) (Figure 8) as well as the top five cities that had a lower homicide rate at Time 2 than expected (Figure 9) All of the cities listed here had a standardized residual equal to or greater than +/- 2 standard deviations from the average estimated residual from the model. Please refer to the appendix for a list of all cities and their residuals.

Figure 8: Top 5 cities with *more* observed homicides in Time 2 than expected

Richmond, California
Cincinnati, Ohio
Portsmouth, Virginia
Birmingham, Alabama
Flint, Michigan

Figure 9: Top 5 cities with *less* observed homicides in Time 2 than expected

Gary, Indiana
Topeka, Kansas
Atlanta, Georgia
Chicago, Illinois
El Monte, California

In order to assess our model’s robustness and accuracy, we conducted a similar analysis on robbery data. We defined Time 1 robbery offenses as robberies that occurred in 2000 and 2001. We defined Time 2 robbery offenses as robberies that occurred in 2004 and 2005 (again due to incomplete preliminary robbery data for 2006). We retained 216 of the original 253 cities (85.3 percent) with complete data for the trend and regression analyses.

When examining the relationship between the city robbery rates at Time 1 with its same rate at Time 2, we see there was a very strong correlation (Pearson's R = .913; $p < .001$). This means cities that experienced a high robbery rate at Time 1 very typically experienced a similarly high robbery rate at Time 2.

Prior to conducting the final regression (T2 onto T1), we assessed our structural variables predictive power at explaining Time 1 robbery in the different cities. Similar to the homicide results, the model's ANOVA F statistic was statistically significant ($p < .01$) and the Adjusted R-Square equaled 0.354, which means that our fixed structural variables explained 35.4 percent of the variance in the city robbery rate at Time 1. Thus, we move to the more detailed analysis where we regression T2 robbery onto T1 robbery, while controlling for the same social and structural processes we controlled for in the homicide analysis.

Table 7 displays the following results from our estimated model. The model's ANOVA F-Statistic, which tests whether or not any of the parameters in the model significantly covary with the outcome, is statistically significant ($p < .01$). The Adjusted R-square equaled .826, which means 82.6 percent of the variance in the city's robbery rate at Time 2 can be explained by our model. Again, this high degree of variance was expected given we are including the city's Time 1 robbery rate as an independent variable. According to the standardized coefficient estimates, the greatest predictor of the city's homicide rate at Time 2 is its rate at Time 1 ($B = .883$).

Table 7: OLS Regression Results for City Robbery at Time 2

Model Parameters	Coefficient	B	St. Error	T-Value
Intercept***	.000061		.000	4.74
Robbery Rate T1***	.861	.883	.035	24.67
<i>CJ Structural-Control Variables</i>				
Prison Dif. *	-.000013	-.053	.000	-1.82
Law Enforcement Dif.	<-.001	-.022	.000	-.714
<i>Demographic-Control Variables</i>				
Income Potential	-.000006	-.031	.000	-.963
Residential Stability	-.000006	-.031	.000	-.824

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$

Here again, we identified the top five cities that had a higher observed robbery rate at Time 2 than expected (based off of the following model) (Figure 10) as well as the top five cities that had a lower robbery rate at Time 2 than expected (Figure 11). All of the cities listed here had a standardized residual of equal to or greater than +/- 2 standard deviations from the average estimated residual from the model. Please refer to the appendix for a list of all cities and their residuals. The numbers in parentheses () refer to that city's homicide residual ranking at Time 2 in the same direction (i.e. more or less) unless otherwise noted.

Figure 10: Top 5 cities with *more* observed robberies in Time 2 than expected

Louisville (Metro), Kentucky	(12)
Oakland, California	(8)
Minneapolis, Minnesota	(85)
Allentown, Pennsylvania	(9)
Las Vegas (Metro), Nevada	(13)

Figure 11: Top 5 cities with *less* observed robberies in Time 2 than expected

Tampa, Florida	(7)
Baltimore, Maryland	more (29)
Atlanta, Georgia	(3)
Newark, New Jersey	more (10)
Miami, Florida	(48)

Next Steps

Having identified cities that appear to have avoided the increase in violent crime, as indicated by falling below what would be predicted as expected levels of violent crime, the next step involved selecting a group of these cities to examine more intensively in the search for common policies, practices and processes that may help account for their outlier status (i.e., lower than expected violent crime rates). Specifically, the next step was to visit certain “industry leader” sites and to learn from police, other government entities, community groups and others what combination of factors may contribute to their lower levels of violent crime. The goal was to identify promising practices and offer recommendations to both local government entities and the federal government in terms of specific strategies that can be employed in communities to suppress/reduce violent crime.

Based on the previous analyses of homicide and robbery rates, four cities were selected for intensive review and site visits. All cities were in the first quartiles on both categories, “Less Homicides than Expected”, and “Less Robberies than Expected.” Cities were selected based on geographic location as well as size. The research team made a point of selecting both smaller and larger size cities as well as cities that reflected the geographic diversity of the nation.

Figure 12: Cities Selected for intensive examination

City	Population†	Homicide Rank	Robbery Rank
Chicago, IL	2,869,121	4 **	20
El Monte, CA	121,740	5 *	9 *
Tampa, FL	317,647	7 *	1 **
Topeka, KS	122,008	2 **	12 *

*Equal to or greater than +/- one standard deviation from the mean

**Equal to or greater than +/- two standard deviation from the mean (i.e. an outlier)

†2000 US Census population

Two teams of researchers conducted site visits in May and June 2008. The researchers had previous contacts in two of the sites (Chicago and Tampa) and two sites were considered “cold calls” (El Monte and Topeka) as the research team had no existing contacts in those cities and spent considerable time setting up these visits. The site visits were based out of the police department. That is, the police department in each city served as the central focus of the visit. Once contact was made, background information was provided about the study, reasons why the city was chosen, and asked the police department to set the agenda. The researchers provided some suggestions as to what other outside agencies might be included in the site visit but for the most part this was left up to organizers on site. On site, interviews were semi-structured and varied in length.

Descriptions of the sites

Chicago

Located on the western shore of Lake Michigan, Chicago has a population of over 2.7 million people. Caucasians comprise almost 42% of the population while African Americans comprise over 36 percent of the population. Chicago also has the third largest South Asian American population in the country. The largest law enforcement agency in the Midwest and second largest in the country, Chicago Police Department (CPD) has 6 police areas, 25 police districts, 280 police beats, and roughly 15,700 sworn police officers.

Tampa

Tampa is one of three incorporated cities located in Hillsborough County, Florida. Hillsborough County covers over 1000 square miles of which 84% of the county is unincorporated. Sixty-four percent of residents in Tampa are Caucasian. Tampa is part of the Tampa Bay Area which covers a five county region including Hillsborough, Pinellas, Polk, Pasco and Manatee counties. The Tampa Bay Area is served by the United States Attorney’s Office of the Middle District of Florida. Violence reduction efforts in Tampa are largely driven by a multi-agency coalition

serving the greater Tampa Bay area, of which the Tampa Police Department is a key partner. The data used in the analysis, however, were specific to the city of Tampa.

Topeka

The City of Topeka is 55 square miles located in Shawnee County, which is 600+ square miles. According to the Chief of Police, Topeka is a city in a rural area that has big city problems. Local officials reported wide income inequality among the residents of Topeka.

The Topeka Police Department staffing level is set at 294 sworn officers. As of May 2008, they had 266 sworn officers with 14 in the academy, meaning the department was short 25-30 officers from previous years (approximately 10 percent), making it difficult to keep up with attrition. The city is divided into 12 patrol areas, which fall into 6 zones. The current chief has been in place just over 18 months. He is a veteran police officer and former police chief of the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department.

El Monte

The City of El Monte is located twelve miles east of Los Angeles in Los Angeles County. The city is just over 10 square miles and it quite ethnically diverse. Hispanics comprise the majority of the residents, followed by Asians, and then Caucasians.

The El Monte Police Department staffing level is set at 161 sworn officers. As of June 2008, the department employed 145 sworn officers, a deficit of 16, again approximately 10 percent under staffing levels. The current Chief of Police is a 37-year veteran of the police department.

Site Visits

One of the challenges in this study was the need to be open to novel approaches to crime prevention and control while at the same time having sufficient structure to make the site visits efficient and productive. Our approach was to employ semi-structured and open ended interviews with a variety of police, prosecution, local government and community representatives based on broad categories suggested in prior research as representing promising components of policing practices (e.g., Weisburd and Braga, 2006; National Research Council, 2004). We also drew upon the research team's experience with Project Safe Neighborhoods and a series of case studies that suggested promising strategies for addressing gun crime consistent with Weisburd and Braga and the National Research Council. This research has suggested that very focused interventions, including focused deterrence strategies, driven by research and crime analysis, developed and implemented through strategic partnerships, and employing problem solving processes, hold promise for reducing violent crime. These principles undergird what Klotas, Hipple, McGarrell (forthcoming) have referred to as the "New Criminal Justice." Klotas et al. argue that contemporary criminal justice practice has been significantly influenced by outline three key concepts: 1) working coalitions, 2) local problem and resource focus, and 3) data based problem solving. Consequently, our site visits attempted to assess whether these sites had formed working coalitions and partnerships, were employing data driven problem solving processes, and were utilizing locally focused interventions targeting individuals, groups/gangs, contexts, and hot spots believed to be driving violent crime.

The second main limitation of this research is that we cannot isolate the specific causal mechanisms nor can we test whether it is these identified promising practices that may account for the lower than anticipated level of violent crime in these four cities in contrast with the other cities included in the sample of cities over 100,000 population. We suspect that at some level virtually every police and sheriff's department can point to some external partnerships, some degree of problem solving, and some degree of data-driven crime analysis. To the extent these processes do, or do not, drive highly focused crime control interventions is likely to relate to the level of integration and coordination of these principles, the level of organizational commitment, and the resulting intensity of implementation. We are not in position to measure these qualities across a large sample of jurisdictions but rather will attempt to point to promising practices common across these four cities.

Chicago

One of the challenges in discussing crime prevention and control efforts in Chicago is that so much is occurring at any given time.⁵ Chicago has been a leader in community policing with resulting widespread partnerships. The Chicago Police Department has adapted and modified COMPSTAT into a comprehensive system for reviewing crime patterns and providing crime intelligence information throughout the police department, decentralized policing structure and accountability, and developed highly focused interventions aimed at gun crime and the nexus of guns, gangs, and drugs. The police department has made significant commitments to technology related to information sharing as well as an extensive camera system. Chicago has a vibrant and very focused Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative aimed at gun crime as well as a significant public health initiative utilizing on street-level outreach workers seeking to prevent violence (Skogan, Steiner, Hartnett, DuBois, Bennis, Rottinghaus, Kim, Van, and Rosenbaum 2003). Many of these initiatives overlap thus making it very difficult to isolate the crime reduction impact of any given strategy. With these qualifications in mind, Chicago does exemplify the key principles described above as promising: working coalitions, locally focused problem solving, data-driven problem solving, and violent crime focused interventions.

For nearly two decades the Chicago Police Department has made an enormous effort to transform the department to a community oriented policing mission and style. Known as the Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), this has involved re-organization of the department into a neighborhood based structure, extensive training of police in principles of community policing, and support for the development of neighborhood-based leaders and associations. Over the years, this has been reinforced through the re-orientation of city services to a congruent neighborhood-based focus. The result has been neighborhood focused coalitions of police, community members, business owners, schools, and city services engaged in problem solving related to crime and disorder.

An additional somewhat unique characteristic of CAPS is that it has been supported by a long research partnership with a team of researchers including Wesley Skogan, Dennis Rosenbaum,

⁵ An additional factor is that in late 2007, the Mayor of Chicago appointed a new Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department who was sworn in on February 1, 2008. As is common in any organization with new leadership, there are changes occurring within the police department. This has included modifications in some of the CPD programs noted below. The programmatic information described in this report is accurate as of 2007.

Susan Hartnett and colleagues. This allowed ongoing assessment and feedback to support revision and refinement of CAPS and benchmarking of both internal organizational change as well as external partnerships. Skogan's (2006) recent book summarizing two decades of this research suggests that although challenges remain, for example in building relationships with non-English speaking Hispanic communities, considerable progress has been accomplished both in terms of organizational transformation and meaningful police-community relationships.

Perhaps aware of research suggesting that community policing alone appears to have a limited impact on reducing crime (e.g., Weisburd and Braga, 2006), the Chicago Police Department implemented a number of crime-focused strategies. Several of these reflect the concept of developing data-driven capacity to analyze local crime problems and to drive interventions. Building and expanding on New York Police Department's COMPSTAT program (Silverman, 1999), CPD had developed two crime pattern review programs supported by a major technological innovation. The weekly crime pattern review meetings include the Violent Incident Strategy Evaluation (VISE) and the Deployment Operations Center (DOC) meetings. The meetings are coordinated and supported by the Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability.⁶

The VISE meetings focus on homicides, aggravated batteries with a firearm, and public violence with a firearm within a particular area of the city and then more specifically on police districts within the area. Violent crime trends are reviewed, incidents are mapped, and local commanders are expected to both be able to discuss trends and patterns and to present plans for responding to emerging violent crime problems. The DOC meetings complement the VISE meetings with a more intensive focus on violent crime hotspots known as level one and level two deployment areas that typically consist of a small number of police beats within police districts. The information shared is very detailed in terms of the individuals and groups involved in violent crime incidents, sharing of intelligence (e.g., gang conflicts), and targeting of known, chronic offenders. This is also an opportunity for local commanders to request the assistance of other units (e.g., gangs, narcotics, additional patrol) to address the problem. The weekly meetings are complemented by daily bulletins focused on homicides and firearms crimes. In addition to sharing information, these meetings and related communication vehicles all reinforce the department's focus on and commitment to reducing homicide and violent gun crime.⁷

The data-driven meetings and intelligence sharing processes are supported by the Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) program. Winner of the Innovations in Government and the IACP iXP Leadership in Technology Awards, CLEAR is described as the "largest transaction police database in the nation" (Technology Update, 2006). The CLEAR database integrates extensive information sources including crimes, arrests, field contact information, gang intelligence, warrants and corrections, and much more. Indeed, reflective of the partnership theme, the database includes information from the Illinois Department of Corrections and federal law enforcement including the Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. It includes both confidential and secure

⁶ This role now falls under the Bureau of Professional Standards.

⁷ Under the new Superintendent, VISE and DOC meetings have been combined into one meeting known as the Crime Analysis Review Meeting (CAR).

information available to police managers and officers utilizing mobile computer terminals to access information, as well as public information to support the CAPS community partnerships.

The amalgamation of these initiatives combines resource sharing, technological advances, and centralized accountability, with decentralization that facilitates very focused interventions at a local level targeted at the individuals, groups and contexts driving crime within neighborhoods and street blocks.

Tampa

Law enforcement officials in the Tampa Bay Area like to think of their community as one small town even though its five-county metropolitan area is the third largest in the United States, houses over 4 million residents and continues to grow at a fast pace. In discussing their ideas on local relations officials attributed their small town feeling to the gentle influences of a southern culture of hospitality. Such feeling seem consistent with the areas' history of successful annexations with the City of Tampa including its most recent in 1988. Whatever its ultimate source, cooperation and collaboration seem deeply engrained in the attitudes, values and working relationships within the local criminal justice system.

Strong and positive working relationships are reported across all law enforcement agencies and across all levels from local to state and federal. The foundation of those is based in strong partnerships that function at the organizational and individual level. Local officials speak of friendships that sometimes go back multiple generations and that permeate organizational boundaries today. These partnerships result in working relationships that go well beyond mutual aid. The agencies in this area work closely together in everything from assuring success on prosecution of cases to formulating anti-crime strategies and carrying them out. As law enforcement and prosecution leaders described them, the links between their agencies are strong and continue to be held together by personal as well as professional ties. At one juncture officials described the many bridges in the area as helping to connect the parts of their community. In other cities officials might have focused instead on the islands that separate their community into distinctly different parts.

It was also clear in Tampa that the existing positive relationships help give shape and direction to the local Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) Initiative which, in turn, provides the forum for exercising these healthy partnerships. Thus, years into the effort, regular meetings are still well attended and still function as a venue for strategy development. The local United States Attorney and particularly the Law Enforcement Coordination Manager have been instrumental in maintaining this process.

It is interesting to note that alongside the enforcement partnerships in the Tampa area there exists a parallel but largely separate partnership among relevant social agencies and treatment programs. At present, services are coordinated through the offices of the largest County in the area. The idea behind that organizational arrangement is that the county facilitates greater stability in service delivery than individual private organizations which may be more strained by the ebb and flow of grant funding and local budgets.

The service providers have formed their own close knit organizations both as a function of being together and to some extent as a function of being separated from the enforcement side. The plan of service work is clearly multidimensional and focuses on providing alternatives to crime and gang membership, preventing gang recruitment and a range of theoretically and geographically widespread interventions.

The relationship between enforcement efforts and treatment efforts is perhaps best illustrated in the agenda for the monthly Project Safe Neighborhoods meetings. Both groups are brought together in the discussion of planning and strategies. They also report to each other on their separate efforts. The treatment providers, however, are dismissed from the meeting when the details of enforcement operations are discussed. This pragmatic but limited notion of partnerships is sometimes later ignored as treatment and enforcement staff will join together in planned community programs and activities.

The combination of collaboration and respect for different areas of operation across enforcement and treatment professionals is matched by another area of agreement. There is a shared understanding across these groups on how best to understand the overall problem of crime in Tampa. Both groups look at crime in the Tampa area as somewhat transient, often changing but never out of control and otherwise largely lacking in drama. That is not to say they do not regard it as serious. They certainly do. But they do not see it as intractable or as a permanent feature of the Tampa social structure. It is not highly organized. Local gangs are most often fragmented and young people often shift allegiances in them. Serious and significant crimes occur with regularity. It is a problem but not a sign of social failure or societal degeneracy. There is a shared belief that many crimes can be prevented and all of them can be cleared by arrest. In short, those who work in and with the criminal justice system are optimistic about what they can accomplish. That optimism is built on a shared understanding of the nature of crime in Tampa.

The level of agreement and optimism about crime in Tampa is accompanied by a growing body of shared information about the problem across the region. Although the engagement of university researchers is sporadic, there is extensive sharing of data on trends and patterns in local crime. This is accomplished through the broad engagement of crime analysts from the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department and other Tampa area police departments in the regional planning sessions associated with PSN. The United States Attorney's office distributes the products of crime analysis, including written reports and crime maps, at the monthly meetings. Crime analysts also attend those meetings and provide briefings on crime patterns across the region. Participating enforcement leaders have built the analysis of these data into the collaborative planning process and also use the data products in their own agencies.

In conclusion, Tampa area enforcement agencies have incorporated all of the three critical elements of modern policing that were identified earlier in this report. In the Tampa area data have been increasingly integrated into a process of strategic planning. There is a widely shared perspective on local crime which supports and encourages police efforts to control the problem. Finally strong partnerships are found across agencies addressing crime in the Tampa area.

Working relationships among law enforcement seem particularly strong in the Tampa area. Local, County and Federal police agencies work well together. These relationships seem to

reflect cultural and historical patterns in the region. They also seem to benefit from the energetic efforts of organizers who have managed to formalize relationships and implement specific anti-crime initiatives. Treatment oriented partnerships also seem strong although they do not have the history or focus of the enforcement partnerships. Enforcement and treatment agency leaders in the Tampa area are not surprised to find that the community has lower than expected crime in some categories, considering its size and population make up. Those leaders tend to see this as a reflection of strong working connections especially in the areas of enforcement and prosecution.

Topeka

Officials in Topeka expressed the view that their citizens have a poor “self-image” of their city. There exists a sense of hopelessness, that is, that nothing can be done to change what is happening in the city, such as crime and the quality of life. In an effort to change the citizen’s perception of the city, the Topeka Police Department committed very formally and very publically to partnerships. The Topeka Police Department has taken a stance that crime control is not just the responsibility of the police department and partnerships would be the only way to engage the community and combat the problems.

Additionally, high ranking officials in Topeka expressed the need and desire to remove the “secrecy” of what goes in their organization. The Chief of Police stated he wanted “transparency.” While this did not mean inviting the public into ongoing crime investigations it did mean trying to involve the community, especially the citizens in public safety.

The Topeka Police Department is a member of a group called Safe Streets of Topeka/Shawnee County. Safe Streets was started by a local Reverend in response to a homicide. The group has grown substantially over the past twelve years and has gained not-for-profit status (501 (c) 3). Within Safe Streets is the Safe Streets Coalition which specifically addresses crime and safety concerns. A brochure on their website states that their Action Plan is to “[e]ngage every man, woman, and child to help combat crime at home, at work, at school and at play” (www.safestreets.org). While the Coalition has been around for over a decade, typical meeting attendance was around 15-30 people. The police department has always had a designated representative at these meetings. But, over the last two years and as a testament to the importance of partnerships, attendance has soared to over 150 people at every monthly meeting.

The focus of the Safe Streets Coalition, as well as the police department, right now is to make Topeka the “Safest Capital City” with over 100,000 population in the country. The mission “To build a comprehensive, multifaceted coalition of community members called the ‘Safest Capital Team’ in an effort to reduce crime and substance abuse in Topeka/Shawnee County.” Using a sports metaphor, they have written a Playbook on how they plan to do this. Ten “teams” make up the Coalition, each with a Captain. The teams are:

- Business
- Education
- Faith Community
- Government
- Health Care
- Law Enforcement
- Media

- Neighborhoods
- Non-Profit
- Parent/Youth

The police chief is the Captain for the Law Enforcement Team. Right now there are 17 plays. Within each play there is a description of the play, reason for the play, the target group, the target area demographics, the time frame to run the play, the resources needed to run the play, desired or projected outcomes, and the play coordinator and his or her contact information. What is quite evident from talking with Coalition team members is how very committed the police department is to this coalition and how the police department recognizes the importance of the community. As someone within the police department put it “Crime is just not a police issue, it’s a community issue. The partnerships have gotten us over the hump.”

A smaller city like Topeka, for obvious reasons, does not have the volume of violent crime found in Tampa and Chicago. Therefore, problem solving and resource focus are directed more towards property crimes than violent crimes. This is not to say that the police department ignored violent crime or does not consider it important. The focus on analyzing and proactively responding to property crime is seen as building the capacity to address violent crime as well. When patterns of violent crime emerge, the Department is well-positioned to rapidly respond with the ultimate goal of preventing further violence. Thus, whereas violent crime is not the dominant focus it remains a top priority and is included in ongoing analysis and strategic planning.

As an example, Topeka has focused recently on gasoline pump drive-offs, which mainly include situations where patrons pump gas and then drive away without paying for it. This crime is a larceny as defined by the Uniform Crime Reports and offers a very simple solution: require patrons to pre-pay for their gasoline. After trying twice unsuccessfully to pass a city ordinance to oblige all gas stations to require pre-payment for gasoline, the police department searched for another avenue. The police department entered into a partnership with the petroleum marketers association. The petroleum marketers association, in cooperation with the police department, mailed out letters to all the gas stations in the area asking them to voluntarily become “pre-pay.” Response to the letter was described as “incredible”. The police department estimates that 90-95 percent of all gas stations in the Topeka area are now voluntarily “pre-pay” stations and that the reduction in the number of larcenies reflects the compliance. According to the Topeka Police Department, those stations that did not voluntarily comply continue to show high levels of gasoline theft.

Another issue facing Topeka was larcenies from vehicles. The police believe these are truly more preventable crimes. Research into the crime showed that items were being stolen from *unlocked cars*, *open garages*, or were left in plain sight, on a car seat for example, presenting too many opportunities for would be thieves. The Topeka Police Department undertook a multifaceted approach. First, they created flyers/door knocker hangers to put on windshields and houses. These notices explained what the police were seeing- a cell phone left on a passenger seat, a garage left open at night, a GPS device left suctioned to a windshield and how simple steps taken by citizens could empower them to reduce crime in Topeka. This “Lock It, Remove It, or Lose It” is campaign one of the plays (#1) in the Safest Capital City Campaign through the

Safe Streets Coalition. The police department was able to partner with area stores like Walmart. Walmart would play the short Public Service Announcement clip on their flat screen televisions located at their entry doors to help remind patrons of their role in preventing crime.

Topeka utilizes a combination of formal and informal partnerships. The police department has dedicated 12 community officers who work side by side with the 12 code compliance (i.e., non-sworn) officers. The code compliance officers will soon be moved to fall under the supervision of the police department, enhancing their response. Additionally, the Topeka Police Department has school resource officers in every middle school and finds these officers are a good source of intelligence. The community has taken on some basic patrol duties, supported by Safe Streets and the police department. Many of these relationships are fostered through the Safe Streets Coalition. Community members are trained and given special indentifying clothing and then patrol their neighborhoods. These patrols are in close contact with police and can communicate things that are happening when the police are not there.

Finally, as can be seen from the above description, data-driven problem solving is the backbone to the police departments efforts. The Topeka Police Department engages in a Compstat style meeting which occurs weekly. These meetings include all officers holding the rank of Lieutenant and above. TPD is also in the process of hiring two more crime analysts to bring the total to three full-time crime analysts.

El Monte

Officials in El Monte report that, in 2002, a focus of the new police administration was to connect with their residents who had a poor self image of their city and sense of hopelessness about changing their quality of life. At the same time, they also sought to identify and empower those residents who wished to take a more active role in their neighborhood and deter crime. Here again, formal partnerships emerged as a key component of police department's effort to change the community's way of thinking.

The El Monte Police Department has taken a somewhat different, yet still very successful approach to formal partnerships. The EMPD created a Community Relations Office, a major referral resource for those with problems who come into contact with police officers in the community. This is a "one-stop shopping center" where community members can go for a variety of services, beyond that of just formal law enforcement. For example, El Monte residents are eligible for *free* counseling services with a certified counselor or one of several counselor interns from a local university. The Community Relations Office is also a place where the police department offers assistance with jobs, clothing, and shelter as well as houses specialized officers dedicated to tackling specific community issues such as graffiti, gangs, or panhandling. Another example is that former gang members can visit with the gang resource officer and he can receive help with job placement or arrange for *free* gang tattoo removal through a partnership with a local medical facility. Police officials believe that Community Relations maintains so many positive relationships with families over time and that Community Relations Officers are often able to prevent serious criminal activity before it comes to fruition.

Faced with limited resources, the El Monte Police Department felt that decentralizing some of their resources would help focus them. El Monte took a more formal approach by dividing their

jurisdiction into 65 areas they call 'reporting districts' or RDs. Each RD has one officer assigned to it and a police Captain oversees the entire RD program. The role of a RD officer is an extra responsibility to the officer's assigned patrol or investigative duties. Patrol officers still respond to calls for service and investigators still maintain a case load. Officers are trained in approaches to working with the community. An RD officer is responsible for knowing the people in his or her area and developing responses to any problems that may arise in the area. The relationships that a RD officer develops within his or her reporting district help to create a sense of trust that reciprocates between the RD officers and the community. This sense of trust is intended to improve the community's self image about the city as well as work to eliminate the sense of hopelessness about improving the quality of life. RD officers are asked to develop two short term projects and one long term project over a 12 month period. The projects are included in minimum standards that each RD officer must meet each year and they are evaluated on their progress towards meeting those yearly goals.

One requirement of RD officers is that they hold what is called a Park, Meet, and Greet (PMG) on each street in their district each year. The police department found that when they tried to hold community meetings, set a place and time, printed and distributed thousands of flyers to find only a handful of community members would attend. Therefore, they decided to try another approach- the PMG. A PMG involves the RD officer enlisting the help of another officer to close off a street. Officers park their cars and turn on their lights and sirens to get the attention of the local residents. They also go house to house and knock on doors, announcing a meeting is being held and asking the residents to participate. As people come out of their houses to see what is going on, the officers convene an informal neighborhood meeting. They introduce themselves, talk about what crime he or she sees occurring in the area, and then ask the residents what they are seeing and what their concerns are. One PMG meeting will draw more people than the above mentioned planned and advertised community meeting.

For the El Monte Police Department, one of their key partners is the El Monte City Schools, the public school system. They have a dedicated School Resource Officer on each high school campus and other officers assigned to the middle and elementary schools. EMPD sees this as a very important and vital partnership. The schools see it that way as well. When funding for School Resource Officers was in jeopardy, the school district matched funding provided by the police department in order to keep the officers on campus. Both the schools and the police department have described this resource as invaluable. The schools view the police department as a resource, both personally and professionally. The schools see how the School Resource Officers are able to bridge the relationship between schools and families. Communication becomes a key element since many families with at-risk youth do not know about the resources available to them until told by the School Resource Officer.

The El Monte Police Department has one dedicated crime analyst who works very closely with officers from all facets of the police department. Additionally, each officer has the capability to request email alerts based on information in the CAD (i.e. computer aided dispatch). The crime analyst has the ability to query any information that the dispatcher includes in the call for service. For example, an officer may request to be notified every time a certain address appears in a run. The department analyst can also set up email alerts for any of their community partners.

Similar to Topeka, El Monte has focused considerable resources on property crime. A local example would be their focus on graffiti. Graffiti has long been a problem in El Monte and has long been high on the priority list for the department. In 2002, the police department decided the problem was big enough to assign one full-time detective to focus on the issue. This focus on graffiti is not just meant to have a positive effect on the physical appearance of the city but also on the juvenile taggers and their families. Housed in the Community Resource Center, the goal is to both help the city and these families.

Officials decided to focus on graffiti because of its very conspicuous affect on the quality of life in the community and the “Broken Windows” (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) effect it would have if it was left visible in the community. Not to mention the endless recidivism if the suspects are not pursued and dealt with through the court system with an attitude modification program, monetary fine, probation or incarceration. One official likened it to the three E's of Traffic Enforcement (i.e. Education, Enforcement and Engineering) but instead, called them the three E's of Graffiti Abatement (Enforcement, Education and Erasure). All three legs of this tripod are needed to be sufficiently adequate to balance the total weight of the problem. Otherwise, it is not a successful program. There is a 24-hour graffiti hotline that anyone can call the hotline when they see graffiti and the goal is to have it removed or covered up within 24 hours of the phone call. School Resource Officers are trained in how to spot potential taggers and the graffiti detective teaches an in-service to all officers on an as needed basis about graffiti trends, patterns, and laws.

The graffiti detective has worked very closely with the District Attorney's Office and the local courts to develop a detailed response to those caught tagging. First time offenders are treated with some leniency as the approach is often informal. Taggers, often times along with their parents, meet with the graffiti detective and are given the opportunity to go straight. If the graffiti detective decides the offender needs a little more formal approach, he will issue a citation to juvenile informal traffic court with a recommendation to the judge for restitution (which the offender can “work off” through community service), counseling, and/or the TORCH (Teaching Obedience Respect Courage and Honor) Program which is delivered by the police department. There is also the option for parenting classes if the graffiti detective sees the need. However, if an offender is convicted, California law mandates that there automatically be a one year delay for that offender receiving his or her driver's license. However, an offender can agree to clean graffiti in a specific area of town for one year in lieu of the one year delay.

The graffiti detective also worked closely with the Prosecutor's Office to develop a formula for restitution based on all the materials to remove the graffiti such as special chemicals, paint, vehicles, ladders, ropes etc. A very conservative estimate is that it costs the City \$10.00 per square foot to remove graffiti. This does not include the salaries of those working to remove the graffiti or the cost of any damages (e.g. a broken window). Additionally, the cost to replace a reflective street sign is \$400.00. These signs often lose their reflective coating when graffiti is removed. It is important to note that the graffiti detective's biggest source of intelligence comes from the School Resource Officers, reflecting the importance of the partnership with the schools. More often than not, a tagger will also tag textbook covers, backpacks, and the like. Their particular moniker or “art” is passed on to the graffiti detective who then may compare it with graffiti sites.

Summary

A set of common themes emerged across the four varying sites (see Figure 13). First, each community has placed significant attention on building strong partnerships with other components of the criminal justice system, with local government, the business community, and with neighborhood groups and residents. These could be formal partnerships such as CAPS in Chicago and Safe Streets in Topeka or more informal partnerships like that between the El Monte Police Department and the City School District or the active group in Tampa organized through the USAO. These partnerships multiplied the resources available for crime reduction efforts as well as set the stage for legitimizing the ongoing efforts of the partners. Additionally, these partnerships fostered information sharing among its members.

Second, each community has established regular processes for analyzing crime patterns, feeding this information to officers and managers, and building accountability for crime prevention and control into the mission of the department. This ranged from formal Compstat style meetings in Chicago and Topeka to regular sharing of crime patterns through other means such as task force type meetings and e-mail. By understanding people, places, and contexts driving local crime problems and coupling these with ongoing assessments of interventions, each site is able to uniquely tailor anti-crime responses as well as to hold managers, the police department, and multi-agency collaboratives accountable for current trends in crime. Additionally, such knowledge of crime problems and anti-crime resources allows these communities to borrow promising anti-crime initiatives from other communities and implement them in the best way that serves the local context.

Third, each department has decentralized policing services to focus on specific neighborhoods and reporting districts. This, too, enhances information sharing and accountability. Similarly, the schools emerged as important location to focus resources. The result of these partnerships, local focus, and data-driven processes are highly focused, deterrence-based interventions. This is consistent with one of the key findings of the National Academies of Science review of effective policing strategies that called for very focused interventions geared toward specific contexts and crime problems (National Research Council, 2004).

Finally, one additional ingredient that was evident in these four cities was leadership. The specific people and roles varied across the sites but in every jurisdiction clear leaders were evident who continually placed emphasis on the need and expectation that the police, working in concert with other community partners, were responsible for preventing and controlling violent crime. This emphasis, in turn, translated into an expectation that ongoing problem analysis would be occurring and that leaders throughout the organization would know what was currently happening in terms of violent crime trends; that department personnel were expected to work in collaboration with multiple formal and informal partners; that problems would be examined at the local level; and, that participating partners would bring resources to bear on these local problems with the result of very focused interventions specific to the area and the specific type of crime. In short, leadership leads to accountability, which is the final ingredient evident in the four site visit cities.

While each of these core components has its promise, there are also inherent limitations (see Figure 14). We would not be surprised in places where, in contrast to the four study sites, the homicide and robbery rates have continued to rise, that there may indeed be one or more of these core components in place. However, we would venture to guess that these core components, if present, are not integrated into the communities' way of doing business making those limitations even more apparent.

One of the limitations of this exploratory investigation is that it was not possible to systematically assess and test the specific dimensions of these common themes. At one level, it is likely true that every police department in the nation can point to partnerships, routine crime analysis, local focus, and focused interventions. Thus, the question remains of whether these dimensions discriminate practices and processes that more or less effectively prevent and control violent crime. Likely this is an issue of "the devil is in the details." The details, in turn, likely include the quality and quantity (i.e. "dosage") of the resulting interventions. In all four cities, evidence pointed to the effective integration of all these components resulting in intensive and focused interventions. The next step will be to take each of these dimensions and create measurable components for each, that is, create performance metrics. First, this would allow for a police department to measure success within the police department over time further increasing the accountability component this research has shown to be so important. Second, this would also allow for comparisons across police departments and permit benchmarking of best practices and the routine assessment of the link between these managerial and strategic processes and the level of violent crime.

Figure 13: Summary of Core Components by Site

City	Working Coalitions	Local Problem & Resource Focus	Data-driven Problem Solving	Focused Interventions/ Focused Deterrence	Leadership & Commitment
<i>Chicago</i>	CAPS (neighborhood groups, businesses, schools, city government); CPD, USAO, Cook County Prosecutor, Department of Corrections	Level One and Level Two Deployment Areas; Focus on homicide and gun crime	CLEAR information system coupled with VISE and DOC meetings	PSN collaboration with Cook County Attorney and U.S. Attorney Office to increase penalties for illegal gun possession and use	Chicago Police Department; USAO- ND IL
<i>Tampa</i>	Active group comprised of regional enforcement and prosecution working with PSN and USAO. Separate treatment coalitions	Widely shared view that crime problem is manageable and controllable. Treatment services coordinated through a single county	Crime patterns and trend data shared regionally by crime analysts. Verbal and written presentation including maps common	Focus on violent crimes and gangs- prevention, alternatives; Enforcement and prosecution working closely on tactical operations	History of good working relationships strengthened by active leadership through USAO- MD FL and Exec LECC
<i>Topeka</i>	Safe Streets Task Force	Safest Capital City Campaign	Compstat style meetings; Increasing crime analyst staff; utilize crime mapping	Gasoline pump drive offs; Larcenies from vehicles	Commitment from the Chief of Police as well as other LE heads
<i>El Monte</i>	Community Relations Office; Partnership with El Monte City Schools	Reporting Districts; Park, Meet, and Greets; School Resource Officers	Dedicated crime analysis personnel; Utilize crime mapping; CAD based email alerts	Graffiti abatement	Commitment from the Chief of Police. El Monte City School District

Figure 14: Summary of Promising Practices

Strategic Component	Promise	Limitations
<i>Working Coalitions</i>	Coalitions with other criminal justice agencies, government, research partners, and businesses can bring additional resources; partnering with community can increase legitimacy and sharing of information	Research suggests that community policing and associated relationships alone do not reduce crime
<i>Local Problem & Resource Focus</i>	The criminal justice system operates under a uniquely local understanding of its crime problems and its anti-crime resources	Local issues may limit
<i>Data-driven Problem Solving</i>	Understanding people, places, contexts driving local crime problems coupled with ongoing assessment of interventions	Timeliness of data
<i>Focused Interventions/Focused Deterrence</i>	Increasing efficiency and effectiveness of crime control strategies	Absent meaningful community partnerships may be perceived as unjust targeting and harassment by police

Figure 15: Suggested Core Components of Effective Policing Strategies



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Technical Appendix

City Level Demographic Variables

Income Potential Factor

Factors: Three measures were included in the income potential construct: percent below 18 years old, percent white and percent that are high school graduates.

All assumptions of the principal component analysis were met in this factor variable, including the extraction meeting the minimum threshold of .50. The component matrix had a minimum loading of .70 or higher for each of the original variables. The Eigenvalue of this component was .57, which means that 57 percent of the covariation among these three variables is observed in our income potential factor variable.

Residential Stability Factor

Factors: percent homeownership, median home income, and people per square mile.

All assumptions of Principal Component Analysis were met in this factor variable. Each measures met the minimum extraction threshold of .50. The component matrix had a minimum loading of .60 or higher for each of the original variables. The Eigenvalue of this component was also .57, which means that the 57 percent of the covariation among these three variables was observed in our residential stability variable.